



# Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Space Launch Designs

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# Presentation Outline

- Establish the importance of estimating and characterizing the different types of uncertainty
- Identify an issue with estimating uncertainty for launch vehicle designs
- Propose two solutions for more accurately capturing uncertainty in launch vehicle designs
- Recommend a solution for future work



# Uncertainty



- Essential Part of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Launch Vehicle Designs
  - Launch decisions
  - Trade studies (borderline scenarios)
  - Risk Management and Risk Acceptance
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Uncertainty for Space Launch Vehicles is present in
  - Models (e.g., assumptions and development)
  - Parameters (e.g., data, environments, demonstrated versus predicted)
  - Failure Scenario Development and Completeness
- Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty
  - Aleatory uncertainty represents natural randomness that occurs in systems
  - Epistemic uncertainty represents “lack of knowledge” or ignorance



# Uncertainty Propagation


- NASA PRA propagates uncertainty via the probabilistic logic models (e.g., fault trees) using Monte Carlo simulation
- Uncertainty is characterized by parameter distributions
- The spread of parameter distributions reflect mostly epistemic uncertainty for space launch design
  - Based on heuristic guidelines or historical data
  - Data applicability

# PRA Structure Influence on Uncertainty

## Logic Structure influences uncertainty propagation

Basic events in OR gates (uncorrelated)


Number of Model Basic Events	Individual Basic Event Error Factor					Resultant Model Error Factor
	5	10	15	20	100	
2	3.4	6.1	8.6	11.1	44.5	
5	2.3	3.8	5.1	6.3	21.3	
10	1.9	2.8	3.7	4.5	13.8	
20	1.6	2.2	2.8	3.3	9.5	



# OR Gate Uncertainty Results

Example of : Five basic events EF = 10 in an OR Gate (EF~3.6); 10k iterations


**Scatterbar Plot**



# PRA Structure Influence on Uncertainty Continued

Basic events in AND gates(uncorrelated)


Number of Model Basic Events	Individual Basic Event Error Factor					Resultant Model Error Factor
	5	10	15	20	100	
2	9.6	26.5	47.1	70.9	700.3	
3	17.5	NA	NA	NA	NA	
4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
20	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	



# AND Gate Uncertainty Results

Example of 3 basic events EF = 3 in an AND Gate (EF~6.7); 10k iterations

Scatterbar Plot







# Examples of PRA Structures

- Launch Vehicle Designs
  - Due to mass, volume, and cost limitations
    - Redundancy at the subsystem level
    - Single point failures at the element level
    - Increased dependencies between elements
- Other Industries
  - Defense-in-depth
    - Redundant safety systems
      - Cost
    - Increased independence at the system level
      - Due to diversity and special separation



# Ramifications of this Issue



- This is a known issue
  - Ginsberg and Ferson; *Different Methods are needed to propagate ignorance and variability*;
- Reduction in uncertainty estimates for launch designs
  - Assuming a lognormal result is an EF  $\sim 2.5$
  - Insensitive to increased epistemic uncertainty
    - Lack of knowledge of components does not contribute to uncertainty
      - Environmental factors
      - Data applicability
  - Uncertainty-Importance routines
    - Inability to prioritize components to reduce uncertainty



# Solutions to Uncertainty Reduction

- Partial Correlation :Solution 1
  - Allows ranked MC sampling from partially correlated variables
  - Pros
    - Represents what is most likely occurring in launch vehicles
    - A form of assigning partial dependency to components
    - Will account for uncertainty anomalies in any logic structure
  - Cons
    - Knowledge to determine partial correlation to different components and subsystems is not available
      - How will we know if the partial correlation is correct?
      - Will this add uncertainty to our results?
    - Current fault tree tool sets only account for full positive correlation with components that have the same failure rates
      - (PRA group is working on developing a tool)
    - Challenging to implement even if the data was available
      - 100 components will require 10,000 correlation relationships (NxN matrix)



# Solutions to Uncertainty Reduction Continued



- Interval Analyses: Alternative Solution 2
  - Estimates the uncertainty of the logic tree by calculating a 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> solution from all the basic events
    - If  $(X + Y + Z)$  is your logic equation then:
      - Lower Bound  $(X^{5th} + Y^{5th} + Z^{5th})$
      - Upper Bound  $(X^{95th} + Y^{95th} + Z^{95th})$
  - Pros
    - Easy to implement
    - Estimates the entire uncertainty band
    - Shows reasonable results for large complex system fault trees for launch vehicle designs
      - EF = 3-5 with component EFs between 3-12
    - Is sensitive to Uncertainty and Importance routines
  - Cons
    - Is an alternative to partial correlations
    - May increase the spread of the uncertainty



# Future Solutions

- Identify where uncertainty for launch vehicle designs may be underestimated
- Develop tools to assign (positive and negative) partial correlation to elements of a Boolean expression
- Estimate partial correlation from environmental factors for subsystems

Is this something dynamic PRA using physics-based models may solve?



# Conclusions

- Uncertainty is an important part of PRA and Risk-Informed decisions
- Launch Vehicle Designs have unique models structures due to mass and space limitations
- Current PRA models for Launch Vehicle designs probably underestimate uncertainty (Shuttle PRA ~2)
- Partial correlation would account for uncertainty
- Until tools or physics-based dynamic PRA is a reality the interval analyses provides a good interim solution



# Questions?



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